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The adverse effect of that reactivation is, similarly, limited. One is that the previous record is revived. The appellant would have to spend a rehabilitation period of seven years before statutory concealment would apply again. That is what Parliament intended. There could be cases where the entry of a conviction would reveal the existence of previous convictions with serious consequences for the offender.

But that is not the case here. However, in most cases, the courts will treat this as legitimate prejudice resulting from the previous offending. A discharge is deemed to be an acquittal. This may include authorities such as current or prospective employers, immigration officials or regulatory licencing bodies.

One of the roles of these authorities is to assess the character of the applicant and his or her suitability for the position or privilege sought. Therefore, it is in the public interest for the offending to be disclosed. I can well accept that if a conviction is going to result in an absolute bar to the offender gaining entry to some profession or career then it may well be appropriate to ameliorate that consequence in an appropriate case by declining to enter a conviction.

In other words, Ms Stewart is not someone who comes to the Court with no prior involvement in the criminal justice system. It seems to me Indeed it is not perhaps going too far to say that to do so the Court would be actively concealing from the statutory body information which ought properly to come before that body.

The same reasoning can be extended to non-statutory authorities such as private employers. However, on appeal from this decision, the Court of Appeal stressed that the above statement is not an absolute rule and may be overridden in appropriate circumstances. A highly relevant factor is whether the offender will have the opportunity to explain the circumstances surrounding his or her conviction.

It is no doubt highly likely that [the defendant] will need to explain the convictions in any such future application, and they will be a factor the relevant authorities or institutions weigh in the overall assessment of the merit of his application, along with his qualifications and his abilities for the position for which he has applied.

However, this factor can only be appropriately weighed by the relevant authorities if the offender is actually given the opportunity to explain. In cases where the authority only knows the fact that there has been a conviction, such as at the first stage of a job application where applications are considered purely on the papers, the offender will probably not have any opportunity to explain.

Even where there is an opportunity to explain the conviction, it is not guaranteed that the authority will actually take the surrounding circumstances into account. In Brown v R , the Court of Appeal thought it was unlikely that most prospective employers would do so.

We do accept that some employers may not be prepared to look beyond the bare fact of a conviction to read what the courts had to say about its circumstances and mitigating factors, but we are not prepared to assume that all or even most will behave in that way, especially where the offender is generally a person of good character This may assume too much: in most cases, the incentive for employers to put time and effort into discovering more about the conviction is low.

Further, details of the offending may not be readily accessible, or employers may not know how to interpret and. It is likely that where two equally qualified candidates are competing for the same position, the fact of a conviction will provide the employer with an easy way of differentiating between the candidates.

However, that does not necessarily make this practice wrong. One of the candidates has committed a criminal offence; the other has not. If they are otherwise equally qualified, this would seem an appropriate and justifiable ground for choosing one over the other. Further, it would go against public interest for the character assessment to favour the person with a discharge over the person with no history of offending if the fact of the offending is hidden.

This would not paint a fair picture of the competing candidates. If the authority would know of the offending regardless of whether a discharge was granted, a discharge may be unnecessary. Considering the court has access to much more material information, it may be in the best position to make such assessments.

Where the conviction bears directly on his or her suitability, such as a dishonesty conviction for someone applying for a job involving access to company accounts, having to disclose it means the consequences will be more severe. However, the courts will and should regard this as legitimate prejudice.

Examples abound where discharges have been denied because they would usurp the assessment of the regulatory body. This is an important factor in balancing the interests of the individual with those of the public.

It goes against public interest to allow an offender to disguise his or her character in these situations as the regulatory body. This was determinative in Blythe, above n 35, at [28]—[29], where the fact that the Police Commissioner would look at all the circumstances of the offending in determining an appropriate internal sanction meant that a conviction did not make a significant difference.

It would be inappropriate for the courts, as agents of the public, to assist an offender in doing so. These concerns would also apply to conditional discharges, as they allow the offender to hide the fact of the offending. However, there is an important difference: an offender who is conditionally discharged is required to show, by refraining from further offending, that he or she is generally of good character and that the offence was a one- off mistake.

This can give the public some assurance that the offender is not hiding his or her real character, but merely this one-off, out-of-character mistake. Much could be said about the consequences of conviction that have been relied on for both successful and unsuccessful applications.

The assessment of these consequences is necessarily a highly fact-specific and individualised exercise. The consequences most commonly relied upon relate to employment, travel, immigration and the general consequences associated with a first conviction.

This article will now focus on employment and general consequences, as both of these illustrate the inequality inherent in the discharge power, and support the conditional discharge model. In some lines of work, a conviction will be an absolute bar to employment; in others, a hindrance.

Where employment is relied on, offenders should provide evidence that establishes both an intention to enter into or continue their chosen career, and the potential effect of a conviction on entering into or continuing that career. This is troubling. Young first-time offenders who, due to developmental immaturity, have made an uncharacteristic mistake are among the most suitable recipients of a judicial concession. In Amstad v Police , Whata J noted: The brand of a conviction for young people who do not have a foothold in a career can be permanently damaging.

This feeds inextricably into an assessment of the proportionality as between the seriousness of the offence and the consequences. Youth has played a role in many decisions to grant a discharge without conviction.

This is an entirely appropriate use of discharges, as: It is at this stage that there exists an opportunity to punish, condemn and tersely warn, without adding an increased layer of difficulty to their lives, which will follow them forever.

However, the current discharge power still requires the offender to satisfy the court that there is a real and appreciable risk that a conviction would have consequences on his or her employment prospects. A young person who has not obtained any qualifications or real work experience may struggle to identify any consequences beyond mere speculation. For these people, a conviction would be doubly disadvantageous as the offender will be left with no job and a criminal record, further decreasing his or her prospects of finding employment.

The conditional discharge power would address this concern. It would allow the young people who do not reoffend to show, through these important developmental years of their life, that they have learnt their lesson and are deserving recipients of a second chance. It could permit many of them to go on and find a career where a conviction may have prevented them from doing so. The courts have also been mindful of the fact that a conviction may have general consequences: I accept In a variety of ways eg.

For those that are remorseful there can be a loss of pride and self-esteem or at least embarrassment in having to answer that question honestly. Embarrassment or loss of pride and self-esteem are consequences that follow from a conviction. They are central to whether the effect on the individual of being tarnished with a criminal conviction outweighs the public interest in seeing offenders properly sanctioned for their conduct. However, it is debatable how much weight should be placed on such consequences where a discharge is not otherwise justified.

While inevitably there have been, and will continue to be, adverse consequences for Mr Edward stemming from this offending, they do not strike me as being significantly different from the consequences that any young person might experience with such a conviction. These general consequences are a natural result of committing a criminal offence.

To an extent, they may be regarded as legitimate prejudice that flows from criminal offending. Placing undue weight on these general consequences would undermine this and other purposes of sentencing, such as holding the offender accountable, promoting a sense of responsibility and deterring misbehaviour.

Once the court has determined the gravity of the offence and identified the direct and indirect consequences, it must then undertake the proportionality test. All factors that. Step two would have considered every relevant consequence of a conviction.

The court must then weigh these factors on the scales and determine where the merits of the case lie. We agree with the latter statement. We note that Richardson J in Turner did not apply any such descriptors or qualifiers.

The test is the test. Simply, under s the Court must be satisfied that the direct and indirect consequences of a conviction would be out of all proportion to the gravity of the offence, before it may consider the exercise of the discretion conferred by s to discharge without conviction.

There must be significant or substantial disproportionality before the test will be met—the consequences must grossly outweigh the gravity of the offence. Where this threshold is not met, the consequences are regarded as legitimate prejudice resulting from the offending.

There is no formulaic or mathematical way of undertaking the proportionality test. It is very difficult to articulate how to achieve this balancing. This difficulty means it is crucial that sentencing judges make explicit the reasons for their decisions to the greatest extent possible. This should include all factors that the judge relied on and the weight apportioned to each. In particular, if one factor is determinative, this should be identified and explained. Under this framework, the sentencing court at least provides the offender with a logical chain of reasoning behind the decision that has been made.

In the absence of this logical chain, the decision can appear subjective and arbitrary, which is highly undesirable in a criminal justice system. However, it would be rare to reach this stage of the analysis only to deny a. It is very difficult to envisage a case where the proportionality test is met but the sentencing court nevertheless refuses to discharge the offender. If the court discharges an offender, it may still impose accompanying orders.

While this step occurs after the decision to grant a discharge, the availability of such orders may support—and even determine—the application for a discharge. They allow the court to meet many sentencing objectives despite entering no convictions.

For example, the orders can vest a sense of responsibility and accountability in the offender, provide general and specific deterrence, serve the interests of the community and, perhaps most importantly, provide for the interests of the victims.

However, a concern with these orders is that they may favour those with the means to effectively buy their way out of a conviction. A system that more readily grants a discharge to someone with the means to immediately pay compensation to the victim naturally favours those who can afford to make such recompense.

It discriminates against those who do not have the means to pay compensation. This may be justified by the desire to satisfy the interests of the victim, but the courts ought to be cautious about apportioning too much weight to the ability to pay compensation in considering whether to grant a discharge or not.

Section 3 c of the Sentencing Act enables the court to make any other order it would have been required to make had a conviction been entered. Some examples include mandatory orders for disqualification from driving, forfeiture orders or confiscation orders. For example, as is common in drink-driving cases, the offender can be discharged, but disqualified from driving.

This serves the public interest where the reason for sanctioning the offender is the high risk he or she poses to public safety. The most contentious and, arguably, problematic aspect of the current law on discharge is the apparent inequality. This is qualified by s 5 : the court is unable to order compensation of sums paid or payable under the Accident Compensation Act Formal equality calls for the same opportunities to be given to all, regardless of background.

Substantive equality recognises that some people may labour under a disadvantage, and provides those people with further opportunity in order to level the playing field where doing so is objectively justified.

Theoretically, a discharge is available as a sentencing option to all facing conviction. However, its focus on individual consequences means that, while discharges formally provides equal opportunity to all, it is not substantively equal. Considerations of the socio-economic background of offenders, the public status of offenders, and the budding sporting careers of offenders account for why two offenders who have committed the same offence under the same circumstances will not necessarily receive the same treatment under the law.

The socio-economic background of offenders plays a notable role in the likelihood of receiving a discharge, for the simple reason that those from higher socio-economic backgrounds tend to have more opportunity, which makes it easier to point to specific consequences of a conviction.

Those from more privileged backgrounds tend to receive higher education and, in turn, tend to pursue careers for which a conviction will have more severe consequences.

With privilege comes opportunity, and those with more opportunity tend to have more to lose from a conviction. The progress of the Sentencing and Parole Reform Bill informs this issue in an interesting way. At its first reading, what is now s of the Sentencing Act contained several factors that the court could take into account: Sub-clause 2 was deleted before the second reading of the Bill at the recommendation of the Justice and Electoral Committee.

The majority of submissions we received on these clauses concern clause 96 2. Most of us agree with these arguments. We recommend clause 96 2 is deleted. Most of us agree the guidance in subclause 1 is sufficiently broad to allow a sentencing judge to determine if a conviction will have a disproportionate effect on the offender.

We do not think it is necessary for this to be explicit and deletion will remove any suggestion of class. Similarly, well-known public figures seem more likely to receive a discharge. This may be due to the public and media interest that makes the consequences of a conviction more severe than for someone who is not a public figure. While this is a legitimate consequence that should be taken into account, placing undue weight on this factor is troubling because it appears to create a class of persons that is, public figures who receive different treatment under the law.

An analogous issue has arisen around name suppression. The third area where apparent inequality has caused a divide of opinion is discharges granted to budding sportspeople. Once you had enough bulbs, you got a tech, but a Great Science gives you a tech at once.

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Share This Page Tweet. Your name or email address: Do you already have an account? No, create an account now. If two modifiers have the same value, they are shown in alphabetical order.

Resurrecting a player clears almost all previous bad opinion modifiers. While not at war, it also opens permanent two-way embassies, and grants the resurrector a permanent Open Borders treaty in the resurrected player's lands. Resurrecting a player will also give you the bonus for liberating one city, in addition to the other bonuses. Score bonus is halved after the duration of one trade deal [4] , and set to zero after the duration of two.

Liberating another of their cities resets the turn counter. Bonus is removed if you declare war on them [3] or capture one of their cities. Bonus decays over time, and is removed if you declare war on them.

You do not receive this bonus with your capitulated vassals, and it is removed upon capitulation if present. Recent trade value for both players is set to 0 if either player declares war on each other, including through vassalage or a Defensive Pact. If caused by bribing another player into making peace with them, the full bonus is also applied to the target AI's teammates.

Disappointing the AI with your diplomatic actions will decrease your "recent assist value", and may replace this modifier entirely. Bonus is removed if you declare war on them. Warning the target AI of coop war plans will also count as sharing intrigue to the target AI's teammates and Defensive Pacts. After the duration of one trade deal [4] , the number of times intrigue was shared is reduced by one.

Sharing intrigue again during this time resets the turn counter in addition to adding to the number of times intrigue was shared.

If the total from this is positive, then it subtracts 5 or the total from the Opinion score, whichever is greater. Even if they change their mind later, the bonus or penalty applied at the time of proposing the resolution will count.

Returning another unit resets the turn counter. If you liberate many stacked civilian units at once, you will receive a bonus for each one returned. If you choose the dialogue option to not forgive them for spying, the bonus will be removed if present. You automatically gain Open Borders and this bonus if they are your vassal or you have resurrected them.

Ingame, bad modifiers with a value of 10 opinion or less will be displayed in a dark red color. Bad opinion modifiers with a value of 11 opinion or more will be displayed in a bright red color. Bad modifiers are shown in an AI player's "opinion table" in descending order by value, from lowest to highest.

Modifiers in bold will not be removed by an AI player's resurrection or capitulation. Declaring war on an AI player while you're friends will cause them to consider you a backstabber. Declaring war on human friends does not count for this, and if a backstabbed AI friend's slot is filled by a human player in multiplayer, the penalty is ignored.

Penalty is removed after 3x the length of one deal duration turns on standard speed. Resurrecting a player will remove this penalty, but having them capitulate to you will not, unlike most modifiers. It does not matter who first conquered the city, or if you obtained it in a trade deal although trading it back to them will remove the penalty.

It is possible, if you are successful in general, to have both this penalty and a Victory Block penalty. If your points are subsequently increased to 5 or higher, you are considered to have broken the promise. Every 25 turns, if 3 or less thefts were performed, the penalty for one theft is reduced by 5. Every 50 turns, the penalty for one theft is removed. Note: If the theft happens while at war, the penalty will decay until a certain point 10 turns left , but will not be fully removed until the AI has confronted you about the stolen artifacts.

In multiplayer games, if you denounce an AI friend and their slot is subsequently filled by a human player, the penalty will be ignored. If the City-State declares war on you, this penalty does not apply. Declaring war as part of a Defensive Pact or vassalage also does not apply a penalty.

Penalty is forgotten after 30 turns since the most recent war declaration, although the number of attacked City-States is still stored in memory. Stealing territory while at war does not incur this penalty, and going to war clears the penalty for both players. City-States that are the AI's permanent allies or that have an Open Door resolution are not considered for this penalty.

Refused a request to start a coop war with an AI friend worse penalty if you also warn the target AI. Chose insulting dialogue options [2]. You will also receive the penalty for ending a Declaration of Friendship if you do so by denouncing them or declaring war on them.

The AI will catch you bribing another player into declaring war on them if their spies have established surveillance in any of the bribed AI's cities. Penalty is forgotten after 30 turns since the most recent bullying, although the number of bullied City-States is still stored in memory [7]. Plundered trade routes when not at war [11]. Plundering a trade route when not at war counts as stealing twice from the owner, and stealing once from the destination civilization.

After the length of one deal duration [4] , the number of times the player was caught stealing is reduced by 1. If the other player is an AI, the number of times they were caught plotting is also reduced by 1. After the length of one deal duration [4] since the player last stole from the AI or lowered their Influence in a coup, the number of coups performed is reduced by 1. The AI will only apply this penalty if their opinion the ranking i. In multiplayer games, if AI friends denounce you and their slot is subsequently filled by a human player, the penalty will be ignored.

The penalty still applies while at war, although the modifier is not visible. It depends on the number of your units the AI can see within 4 tiles of one of their cities. Units inside your own borders count as half, and the AI doesn't count units that are within 4 tiles of a city owned by another player you're at war with. The AI will request that you stop converting their cities if you have at least 5 "religious conversion points" see above , and they haven't previously made the request [7].

If the total from this is positive, then it adds 5 or the total to the Opinion score, whichever is greater. Denouncing 2 or more friends will cause all AIs to view you as a backstabber, unless you're a vassal. The penalty is 10x the amount of demands made; however, after the first two demands, the demand is only counted if it was accepted by the AI. Penalty is not applied if you have an opinion penalty for breaking a City-State bullying promise.

After half the length of one deal duration [4] , the penalty for plundering one trade route is removed. Plundering another trade route during this time resets the turn counter, in addition to worsening the penalty.

The AI will request that you stop converting their cities if you have at least 5 points, and they haven't previously made the request [7]. If you promise to stop your conversions, your points will be set to 4. After the length of one deal duration [4] , religious conversion points are reduced by 1. Converting another city during this time will reset the turn counter in addition to adding more points. Killed Great People apply a worse penalty than normal units, particularly if the turn is less than The penalty also scales based on game speed.

The calculation for warmongering penalties is too complicated to display here and involves numerous factors; however, some important caveats are noted below. AI leaders have a Warmonger Hate flavor which determines how much they care about warmongering.

If the flavor is 7 or higher, "they hate warmongers". If it's 5 or 6, "they dislike warmongers". If it's below 5, "they overlook modest warmongering". Vassals do not obtain warmongering penalties; they also don't care about their master's warmongering, and upon vassalization, any previous warmongering penalty is cleared for both players.

You will not obtain penalties for declaring war with players who are also at war with the target. You will not obtain penalties for declaring war if it was done because of a Defensive Pact or vassalage. If the City-State Diplomacy mod is active, the Global Peace Accords resolution will increase warmongering penalties and decrease the decay rate.

The Casus Belli resolution will decrease warmongering penalties and increase the decay rate. Sanctioned players will also have warmonger penalties against them halved, and they will decay faster. You do not obtain an opinion penalty for having one vassal; if you have two or more, the penalty is 10x the number of vassals you have.

These modifiers are displayed to give information to the player, but do not affect your Opinion score. Neutral modifiers are displayed in white text. This is only to give information to the player, since AI teammates don't use or calculate Opinion score.

Other modifiers like warmongering don't apply to teammates and won't appear at all in the list of modifiers. This modifier is 0 by default, but can be changed to a positive or negative value in the DiploOpinionWeights. For the AI civilization to declare war on a major civilization through the normal process, the following conditions must be met:.

While the AI will not declare war on other players normally unless all of the above conditions are met, it can also declare war under the following circumstances:. Popular pages. New Game Concepts. Happiness Monopolies Corporation Warscore. Explore Wikis Community Central. Register Don't have an account? Detailed Guide to Diplomacy. Edit source History Talk 0. This is rarely important, however, because resurrecting a player clears most negative modifiers. This is also the case if either player has previously resurrected the other while not at war.

Barbarians, dead players, players the evaluating AI hasn't met, players with no cities, and City-States with only one city do not count. If they do not have visibility, the notification will state that Barbarians were responsible.

This means that Morocco will not receive diplomacy penalties if they plunder trade routes while they're out of sight. This also applies to Defensive Pacts, players that have an Opinion score of or lower ALLY , players who have resurrected them, players who they've resurrected, and players who they've promised not to attack for a number of turns.

The AI also performs this check when declaring war through other means. Categories Add category. Cancel Save. Fan Feed 1 Civilizations 2 Units 3 Vassalage. Universal Conquest Wiki.